

Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 STOCKH 00036 01 OF 03 050826Z
ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-05 H-01 INR-07
L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15
USIA-06 IO-13 ACDA-12 SOE-02 DOE-11 OES-07 TRSE-00
/104 W

-----072905 050847Z /11

R 041422Z JAN 78
FM AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2685
INFO AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN
AMEMBASSY HELSINKI
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY OSLO
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK
USMISSION USNATO
USCINCEUR VAININGEN GE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 3 STOCKHOLM 0036

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: MPOL, NATO, UR, NO, SW, FI, XZ
SUBJECT: THE KOSYGIN INCIDENT AND SOVIET NORDIC POLICY

REF: 77 MOSCOW 18499 (DTG 231600Z DEC 77)

1. SUMMARY. AGREEING WITH EMBASSY MOSCOW'S FIRST-RATE ANALYSIS OF SOVIET MOTIVES IN ITS NORDIC POLICY (REFTEL), WE WOULD ADD THE FOLLOWING POINTS: (A) WHILE THE NORDIC MINISTERS CONSIDERED KOSYGIN'S BEHAVIOR IN HELSINKI OBJECTIONABLE, THEY GOT HIS MESSAGE: THE USSR SHOULD BE HEARD ON NORDIC STRATEGIC ISSUES AND IT WAS DISPLEASED WITH TRENDS IN NORWAY. (B) THIS IS OLD SOVIET POLICY, WHICH WE EXPECT TO CONTINUE. (C) THE NORDICS RESENT SOVIET "SUPER-POWER BEHAVIOR" AND ITS CLAIM TO A
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 STOCKH 00036 01 OF 03 050826Z

SPECIAL STATUS IN THE NORDIC AREA. (D) THE SWEDES BELIEVE SOVIET PRESSURE CAN BE RESISTED AS LONG AS NO ATTEMPT IS MADE TO ALTER THE BALANCE ON THE NORTHERN FLANK AGAINST SOVIET INTERESTS. (E) THE NORDICS HAVE MORE BACKBONE THAN THEY ARE OFTEN GIVEN CREDIT FOR, AND NORDIC SOLIDARITY IS AN IMPORTANT FACT. (3) OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE SOVIETS TO TRY TO TILT THE SO-CALLED NORDIC BALANCE

MORE IN THEIR FAVOR MAY PRESENT THEMSELVES. (F) THE LACK OF SOVIET SOPHISTICATION ILLUSTRATED BY THE KOSYGIN INCIDENT UNDERLINES THE NEED FOR SOPHISTICATION IN US POLICY IN SUPPORT OF THE NORDIC PORTION OF THE WESTERN WORLD. END SUMMARY.

2. WE BELIEVE THAT WHILE THE NORDIC MINISTERS CONSIDERED KOSYGIN'S BAHAVIOR IN HELSINKI REMARKABLE AND OBJECTIONABLE, THEY UNDERSTOOD THE SOVIET MESSAGE: THAT THE USSR SHOULD BE HEARD ON NORDIC STRATEGIC ISSUES AND THAT IT WAS DISPLEASED WITH TRENDS IN NORWAY. THIS IS OLD SOVIET POLICY. (IN A LONG GO-ROUND ON THE INCIDENT DEC 28 WITH THE DCM, THE MFA'S SENIOR SOVIETOLOGIST, STELLAN BOHM, SAID KOSYGIN EXPRESSED THE FAMILIAR SOVIET POLICY OF KEEPING PRESSURE ON THE NORDIC COUNTRIES AND ON NORWAY IN PARTICULAR. HE RECALLED THE SOVIET DISPATCH OF TWO DIVISIONS TO THE VICINITY OF THE NORWEGIAN BORDER IN 1967 AS AN EXPRESSION OF THE SAME PRESSURE POLICY.)

3. THE SWEDES (AND WE BELIEVE THE OTHER SCANDINAVIANS) DO NOT FORESEE ANY MAJOR HARDENING OF SOVIET NORDIC POLICY, AND WE AGREE WITH THIS ASSESSMENT. THUS WE WOULD BE SURPRISED IF THE SOVIETS ASKED FOR CONSULTATIONS SOON UNDER THE FENNO-SOVIET TREATY, FOR WE EXPECT THEM TO RESERVE THIS IMPORTANT WEAPON FOR MORE TROUBLOUS OCCASIONS. (BOHM MADE THE GOOD POINT THAT THE SOVIETS OFTEN ACT TO CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 STOCKH 00036 01 OF 03 050826Z

COUNTER TRENDS THEY PERCEIVE AS DEVELOPING AGAINST THEIR INTERESTS. SINCE THEY ATTACH GREAT WEIGHT TO NATO NORTHERN FLANK DEVELOPMENTS, AND LOOK ON ANY FRG EXPANSION OF ACTIVITY WITH SPECIAL SUSPICION, THE SOVIETS MAY FEEL THAT THEY MUST MAKE THEIR VIEWS KNOWN EARLY, HEAVILY AND OFTEN IN ORDER TO KEEP ANY UNFAVORABLE TENDENCIES FROM GATHERING MOMENTUM.)

4. WE ATTACH PARTICULAR WEIGHT TO MOSCOW'S POINT (PARA 1 REFTEL) THAT THE USSR CONSIDERS ITSELF VIRTUALLY A NORDIC COUNTRY, ENTITLED TO SPECIAL STATUS IN THE AREA. (DISCUSSING THIS ASPECT WITH BOHM, WE RECALLED GROMYKO'S DICTUM THAT THE SOVIET UNION NOW HAD TO BE CONSULTED ON ANY MAJOR QUESTION ANYWHERE IN THE WORLD. BOHM REMARKED THAT THE SOVIETS CONSIDERED THEMSELVES NORDICS IN SCANDINAVIA, EAST EUROPEANS IN EASTERN EUROPE, ASIANS IN THE FAR EAST, MIDDLE EASTERNERS IN THE MIDDLE EAST, AND SO ON.) SPEAKING AS THE BIG DADDY OF THE NORDICS, THE SOVIETS, WE EXPECT, WILL CONTINUE THEIR PAST POLICY OF INTERMITTENT PRESSURE ON THE NORDICS SEPARATELY, WITH SPECIAL ATTENTION TO NORWAY. OCCASIONALLY, BUT ONLY RARELY, THEY MAY TRY A COLLECTIVE APPROACH, AS WITH THE

KOSYGIN LECTURE IN HELSINKI. THIS POLICY OF PRESSURE
WILL PRESUMABLY INCLUDE:

-- CONSTANT REQUESTS FOR CONSULTATION IN WHICH SOVIET
VIEWS ARE LAID OUT HEAVILY. (UNFORTUNATELY WE DO NOT SEE
THESE CONSULTATIONS AS ATTEMPTS TO REDUCE TENSION IN
NORTHERN EUROPE--AS STATED IN HELSINKI 3084, WITH WHICH
WE OTHERWISE ARE LARGELY IN AGREEMENT--BUT MAINLY AS
CHANNELS FOR BIG BROTHER TO EXERT INFLUENCE.)

-- RECURRING PRESS CRITICISMS REMINDING THE
NORDICS OF THE WATCHFUL SOVIET EYE AND PINPOINTING ANY
DEVELOPMENTS (ESPECIALLY INVOLVING GERMANY) WHICH INCUR
SOVIET DISLIKE--WITH ATTENTION TO FINLAND'S SUSCEPTIBILITY
TO PRESSURE BECAUSE OF THE BILATERAL TREATY.

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 STOCKH 00036 02 OF 03 050816Z
ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-05 H-01 INR-07
L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15
USIA-06 IO-13 ACDA-12 SOE-02 DOE-11 OES-07 TRSE-00
/104 W

-----072852 050847Z /11

R 041422Z JAN 78
FM AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2686
INFO AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN
AMEMBASSY HELSINKI
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY OSLO
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK
USMISSION USNATO
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 3 STOCKHOLM 0036

-- HARSH OBJECTIONS TO ANY PLANS WHICH INCREASE REAL
NATO MILITARY STRENGTH OR ITS GENERAL VISIBILITY IN THE
NORDIC AREA, PARTICULARLY ANY PLANS INVOLVING THE FRG.
(SMALL EXAMPLE: SOVIET ALARMS ABOUT AN FRG NAVAL VISIT
TO HELSINKI IN 1976; SUBSEQUENTLY--WITH HOW MUCH
CONNECTION ONE DOES NOT KNOW--THE FINNS TURNED DOWN A
US DESTROYER VISIT WHICH THE SWEDES THEN PROMPTLY

ACCEPTED IN ADDITION TO ONE ALREADY SCHEDULED. SOVIET ALARMS ABOUT ANY FUTURE FRG PRESENCE IN NORWAY WILL BE MUCH SHRILLER.)

5. WHILE SOME OF THE FOREGOING TREADS ON EMBASSY MOSCOW'S TERRITORY (FOR WHICH WE APOLOGIZE), THIS EMBASSY'S MAIN CONCERN IS WITH SWEDISH AND NORDIC CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 STOCKH 00036 02 OF 03 050816Z

REACTION TO SOVIET BEHAVIOR. OUR PRIMARY POINT IS THAT THE NORDICS DO NOT LOOK ON THE USSR'S "SPECIAL STATUS" THE WAY THE SOVIETS DO. WHILE THEY FACE THE FACT OF SOVIET POWER, THE SWEDES (AND WE THINK THE OTHER NORDICS) RESENT SOVIET "SUPER-POWER BEHAVIOR"--AS MFA SECRETARY GENERAL LEIFLAND DEMONSTRATED WHEN HE SAID THAT KOSYGIN TRIED TO TALK TO THE NORDIC MINISTERS IN HELSINKI AS IF HE WERE TALKING TO WARSAW PACT MINISTERS IN EAST BERLIN. SOME SWEDES CONSIDER THE SOVIETS ILL-INFORMED ABOUT NORDIC TRENDS, OTHERS CONSIDER THEM WELL-INFORMED BUT SHOWING LOFTY DISREGARD OF NORDIC FEELINGS: IN EITHER CASE, THERE IS CONCERN THAT THE COMBINATION OF SOVIET POWER AND SOVIET INSENSITIVITY (OR ARROGANCE) MIGHT LEAD TO HEAVIER SOVIET PRESSURE--NOT AS A NEW HARDER POLICY BUT AS TOUGHER ENUNCIATION OF OLD POLICY. SWEDISH SOVIET-WATCHERS SEE FINLAND (SOME THINK FINLAND "AFTER KEKKONEN" PARTICULARLY) AS A VULNERABLE POINT FOR THE APPLICATION OF SOVIET PRESSURE FELT THROUGHOUT THE NORDIC AREA. OTHERS SEE NORWEGIAN-SOVIET DISAGREEMENT OVER SVALBARD OR FISHING OR FRG PARTICIPATION IN NATO MANEUVERS AS PROVIDING THE EASIEST PRESSURE POINT FOR THE SOVIETS.

6. THE SWEDES BELIEVE THAT SOVIET PRESSURE CAN BE RESISTED AS LONG AS NO ATTEMPT IS MADE TO ALTER THE BALANCE ON THE NORTHERN FLANK AGAINST SOVIET INTERESTS. THUS SWEDEN (LIKE FINLAND) STANDS STAUNCHLY FOR THE STATUS QUO--AND IN FACT HAS DONE SO EXPLICITLY IN GOVERNMENT STATEMENTS. (SEE STOCKHOLM 1542, NOTAL). THE SWEDES, WE BELIEVE, ENCOURAGE THE NORWEGIANS NOT TO IRRITATE THE SOVIETS BY UNNECESSARY STEPS SUCH AS OPENING THE DOOR TOO WIDE TO THE GERMANS--BUT BY THE SAME TOKEN THEY ENCOURAGE THE FINNS (WE BELIEVE) NOT

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 STOCKH 00036 02 OF 03 050816Z

TO BOW TO SOVIET PRESSURES IN SUCH A WAY AS TO DISTURB NORDIC SOLIDARITY.

7. TO BE BOTH BLUNT AND PAROCHIAL, WE THINK THE NORDICS HAVE MORE BACKBONE THAN THEY ARE OFTEN GIVEN CREDIT FOR. PUBLIC OPINION IN SWEDEN (AND WE BELIEVE IN NORWAY AND DENMARK) IS PROFOUNDLY SUSPICIOUS OF THE SOVIETS. THIS SUSPICION IS HEIGHTENED BY MALADROIT SOVIET MOVES (SUCH AS THE KOSYGIN LECTURE IN HELSINKI); AND THE HUMAN RIGHTS FOCUS THAT CAME WITH CSCE HAS WORKED AGAINST THE SOVIET IMAGE. ON THE PRACTICAL BILATERAL PLANE, WE SEE MANY INSTANCES OF THE SWEDES STANDING UP TO THE RUSSIANS --PROTECTING DEFECTORS, REFUSING TO GIVE A RECENT PLANE HIJACKER BACK, CONDEMNING SOVIET HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS. COLLECTIVELY, WE THINK THE SWEDES AND OTHER NORDICS MEAN IT WHEN THEY SAY THAT SOVIET PRESSURE TENDS TO PUSH THEM TOGETHER. THE NORDIC RELATIONSHIP IS DEEPER THAN OUTSIDERS SUSPECT, PARTICULARLY THE SWEDISH-NORWEGIAN BOND: DIVIDING TO CONQUER UP HERE IS NOT SO EASY AS IT IS FOR THE SOVIETS IN EASTERN EUROPE, WHERE EACH NATIONALITY TRADITIONALLY DESPISES ITS NEIGHBOR.

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 STOCKH 00036 03 OF 03 050841Z
ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-05 H-01 INR-07
L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15
USIA-06 IO-13 ACDA-12 SOE-02 DOE-11 OES-07 TRSE-00
/104 W

-----072974 050846Z /14

R 041422Z JAN 78
FM AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2687
INFO AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN
AMEMBASSY HELSINKI
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY OSLO
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK
USMISSION USNATO
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 3 OF 3 STOCKHOLM 0036

8. WE DO NOT SEE ANY SHORT-TERM LIKELIHOOD OF SOVIET AGGRANDIZEMENT OF ITS POWER POSITION IN THE NORDIC AREA. (IN SAYING THAT HE DID NOT BELIEVE THE DOSYGIN INCIDENT FORETOLD ANY NEW DEPARTURE IN SOVIET NORDIC POLICY, BOHM SAID HE DID NOT SEE WHAT ELSE THE SOVIETS COULD DO TO MAKE THE NORDIC SITUATION SIGNIFICANTLY DIFFERENT.) WE DO SEE THE CONTINUATION OF SOVIET PRESSURE BY FAMILIAR MEANS, WITH SOME LIKELIHOOD OF THE NORDICS (OR OURSELVES) PERCEIVING A TOUGHENING OF THE SOVIET STANCE BECAUSE OF POSSIBLE HEAVY-HANDED APPLICATION OF PRESSURE IN SPECIFIC INSTANCES (AS THE KOSYGIN CASE ILLUSTRATED). LOOKING DOWN THE ROAD, WE SEE A NUMBER OF UNKNOWN COMPLICATING THE SCENE: THE UNCERTAINTIES OF THE POST-KEKKONEN ERA IN FINLAND; THE EFFECT OF A PROFOUNDLY CHANGING ECONOMIC
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 STOCKH 00036 03 OF 03 050841Z

SITUATION UPON SWEDEN AND UPON SWEDISH SELF-CONFIDENCE; THE UNPREDICTABLE OUTCOME OF A NUMBER OF NORWEGIAN-SOVIET BILATERAL PROBLEMS, SOME OF WHICH TOUCH UPON IMPORTANT SOVIET INTERESTS; THE EVOLUTION OF NATO ITSELF--INCLUDING THE STRATEGIC CHANGES THAT MAY BE WROUGHT BY THE CRUISE MISSILE, AND INCLUDING THE GROWING ROLE OF THE FRG IN NATO--AND ITS EFFECT UPON THE BALANCE IN THE NORTHERN FLANK; THE GROWING DEPENDENCY OF SWEDEN AND THE OTHER SCANDINAVIANS UPON THE US AND THE WEST FOR A CREDIBLE DEFENSE BASED ON UP-TO-DATE TECHNOLOGY; AND SO ON. AS EVENTS UNWIND, THE SOVIETS MAY SEE OPPORTUNITIES OR DANGERS THAT CAUSE THEM TO INCREASE THEIR PRESSURE, PERHAPS TURNING TO CONSULTATION WITH FINLAND AS A START TOWARDS TILTING THE SO-CALLED NORDIC BALANCE MORE IN THEIR FAVOR.

9. IF THE KOSYGIN INCIDENT ILLUSTRATES THE LACK OF SOPHISTICATION IN SOVIET NORDIC POLICY, THIS UNDERLINES THE NEED FOR SOPHISTICATION IN US POLICY. EXPECTED SOVIET PRESSURES GIVE US THE OPPORTUNITY TO RESPOND BY RESPECTING NORDIC SOLIDARITY AND THE NORDIC INCLINATION TO STAY OUT OF GREAT POWER CONFLICT AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE. WHILE THE NEED FOR THE US TO SUPPORT THE DEFENSE CREDIBILITY OF SWEDEN AND THE OTHER NORDIC COUNTRIES WILL GROW, CONCOMITANTLY WE MUST INCREASE OUR RESPECT FOR SWEDISH NEUTRALITY, FOR FINLAND'S SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP WITH THE USSR, AND FOR NORWAY AND DENMARK'S SPECIAL POSITION WITHIN NATO--IN SHORT, OUR RESPECT AND SUPPORT FOR THE COMPLICATED RELATIONSHIP WHICH IS CALLED "THE NORDIC BALANCE" AND WHICH WORKS, WE BELIEVE, FOR THE SECURITY OF THIS PART OF THE WESTERN WORLD. IN SHORT, THOSE OF US WHO RESIDE IN THE AREA LIKE TO THINK THAT SOVIET PRESSURE ON THE NORDICS WILL MEAN NOT THE NORDICS'
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 STOCKH 00036 03 OF 03 050841Z

CONFORMING TO SOVIET DESIRES BUT THEIR HOLDING TO THEIR
OWN PATH. THIS IS STILL MORE A HOPE THAN A PREDICTION,
AND A LARGE AMOUNT OF WISE US SUPPORT WILL BE NEEDED
TO MAKE IT COME TRUE.
KENNEDY-MINOTT

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 jan 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: FOREIGN POLICY POSITION
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 04 jan 1978
Decaption Date: 01 jan 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 20 Mar 2014
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1978STOCKH00036
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
Film Number: D780008-0112
Format: TEL
From: STOCKHOLM
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1978/newtext/t19780199/aaaadfwq.tel
Line Count: 342
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Message ID: 98dd8be6-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ACTION EUR
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 7
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: 77 MOSCOW 18499
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 27 apr 2005
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 3827997
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: THE KOSYGIN INCIDENT AND SOVIET NORDIC POLICY
TAGS: MPOL, UR, NO, SW, FI, XZ, NATO
To: STATE
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odbc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/98dd8be6-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Sheryl P. Walter
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
20 Mar 2014
Markings: Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014